What the Early Years of Air Power Can Tell Us About Mastering Drone Power
Featured in the Trinity 2025 issue of the Oxford Emerging Threats Journal
The Ukraine War has triggered a sharp acceleration in defence tech that Western Europe is struggling to keep pace with. American and European aid has given the Ukrainians the ability to test and experiment with drones and autonomous weaponry on a massive scale and with impressive results. Drones have been deployed on the frontline and to penetrate deep into Russian territory, even going as far as Moscow. They can attack tanks, fighter jets, missile launchers, and critical infrastructure. This is the birth of truly modern warfare.
Anduril, a defense tech startup, is an essential supplier of AI-enabled drones for the Ukrainians, providing them with a technological edge in battle. The UK Government has formed a partnership with Anduril and the company is looking to open a factory in the UK following the announcement of Arsenal-1 in Columbus, Ohio. Plenty of defence tech startups have sprung up in the United States, as showcased by the recent American Dynamism Summit at which Vice-President J.D. Vance spoke. But growth of this sector in the UK has been much more modest. Why?
Smaller capital markets and complex regulation hindered growth, not just in defense tech. ESG rules and activist shareholders remain firmly against increasing private defence investment. But the Labour Government, by geopolitical necessity, is pushing back. Around 100 Labour MPs wrote a public letter to the Financial Times demanding that defence be listed as an ethical investment. Ministers are committed to increasing defence spending to 2.5% by 2027 as well as measures to spur defence innovation. But to ensure this money is well spent and that defence tech startups can truly thrive, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to put in place the right institutional framework for autonomous weaponry.
At a time of technological transformation, it is worth examining previous eras when innovation prompted strategic reassessment. In the first World War, militaries learned how to utilize air power, just as we must do for the opportunities and challenges of drone power. Airpower during the First World War was split between the British Army under the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), formed in 1912, and the Royal Navy through the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), formed in 1914. This split strategy for air defence, procurement, and training. Committees chaired by senior ministers failed to make sense of the supply chain, partially thwarted by Whitehall departmental rivalry between the Admiralty and the War Office.
Following a rise in civilian casualties from German aerial attacks in 1917, Jan Smuts, then a member of the Imperial War Cabinet, was charged by Prime Minister Lloyd George to establish a new Air Ministry. A gifted administrator but with no knowledge of airpower, Smuts used the expertise of Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson, the RFC's first commander general. The Smuts report redefined airpower in two important regards. First, it established the bounds of air defence by creating the London Air Defence Area. Second, it made the case for the air force as a means of carrying out war operations, such as bombing raids, reconnaissance, and search and rescue missions. By November 1917, legislation was passed to lay the foundations for the Royal Air Force, all while war in Europe still raged.
Anticipating the future of warfare placed Britain in a strong position ahead of the Second World War. The first World War was dominated by conflict on land and at sea – air remained at the edge of strategic consideration. However, airpower became absolutely critical during the Second World War and in subsequent conflicts. Britain used its experience to establish a framework in which airpower could be harnessed into an effective fighting force, which would save the country from invasion in 1940 and contribute towards the liberation of Europe. The Air Ministry developed radar in 1935 as a result of these efforts, which was used to create an early warning system that aided the nation’s survival during the Battle of Britain for air superiority.
This history could inform strategy for artificial intelligence in drone warfare. AI software can be used to programme drones to behave in certain ways, such as loitering at key locations, moving together as a swarm, predicting the location of roadside bombs, collecting data, and enhancing personnel's use of drones through “smart goggles.” Just as air power sparked innovative defense thinking, drones should be a central part of Britain’s wider strategic reassessments.
During the interwar period, the Government rightly cultivated airpower. One such example was the effort made to increase domestic aircraft production during the 1930s. As Chancellor and then Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain put additional funds into building aircraft, with Rolls Royce manufacturing cutting-edge engines before Germany's remilitarisation of the Rhineland and subsequent annexations. More affordable single pilot fighter planes were prioritised over costly bombers. Winston Churchill's leadership during the nation's darkest hour benefitted from the work done during the 1930s to develop the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters.
Today, the UK is playing catch up and must be capable of rapidly manufacturing cutting-edge autonomous munitions at home. Drones also have a short life span on the battlefield, which is why the UK needs to be able to replace lost units very quickly. New fighter jets and warships take significantly longer to develop and build, and are far more expensive, whereas drones present a cheaper and more nimble style of warfare to help in the interim. This is especially important when the nation’s fiscal situation is so weak and growth forecasts have been halved.
There were many ways in which airpower could be linked to existing technologies and institutions during the 1910s. But exploiting its unique advantages and addressing the vulnerabilities it created required a new approach. Drone warfare presents a similar challenge and opportunity for the UK. In the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Baltic, the UK cannot wait till the mid-2030s for its new fighter jets and nuclear submarines to deter Russia. Instead, by reshaping our defence infrastructure to accelerate the development of drone warfare, the UK can achieve a more impressive rate of return on its investment and spur other advances in defence tech, better preparing the country for the task of protecting Europe.
This means recognising how it is easier to deliver innovation quickly through new institutions and structures. It is much easier to establish new institutions that can accomplish policy goals than to reshape existing ones to meet new demands. In a field changing as rapidly as defence tech, this is a vital lesson for policymakers to learn. Drone power is currently split between the different branches of the armed forces. To rapidly develop drone technology and at a costefficient level, drones should not be placed with any existing branch of the armed forces. Instead, a UK Drone Command, with the brightest minds from across the military, civil service, and tech, can help formulate better drone defence policy, such as looking at how critical infrastructure can be protected and finding the best ways of deploying autonomous weaponry on the battlefield. Just as the advent of airpower prompted institutional growth at the MoD, the potential of drone warfare must do the same.
New tech requires new tactics, logistics, and ways of thinking. It also requires much faster and more flexible means of prototyping and purchasing weapons and equipment, drawing up its own command manual, and coordinating between the different branches of the military. In the decade it will take to build the Dreadnought-class nuclear submarines and the new American F-47 fighter jet, huge leaps in drone technology will occur with or without the UK. This is the strategic imperative of a new joint command with control over staff, training, and procurement for drone operations. If the MoD remains structured for the last war, Britain risks losing its technological and organizational edge.
Featured in the Trinity 2025 issue of the Oxford Emerging Threats Journal.